Farruggia v. Town of Penfield

This appeal addresses an order by the New York Supreme Court denying summary judgment, granting summary judgment, denying partial summary judgment, and granting a motion for leave to amend. The Plaintiff, Gaetano Farruggia, was a construction worker and backhoe operator. The Defendant, Town of Penfield, hired the Plaintiff’s employer to complete a project (Project) on the Co-Defendant’s, Kenneth and Suzanne Hershey, property. The Project involved performing paving work on the sidewalk and driveway. While the Project was located on the co-defendant’s property, it was also located within the Defendant’s right-of-way through Co-Defendant’s property. It appears that an area of land (Landing Area) outside of Defendant’s right-of-way, but inside and wholly located on the Co-Defendant’s property was being used to park construction vehicles and equipment. At the end of a workday the Plaintiff parked a backhoe in the Landing Area which rolled into a ravine, injuring him. Plaintiff commenced an action against the Defendant and Co-Defendant under Labor Law and common-law negligence.

The Supreme Court denied Defendant’s motion for summary judgment in dismissing the Labor Law cause of action and granted Co-Defendant’s motion summary judgment. It also denied part of Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment granted part of Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend their bill of particulars. Defendant appealed and Plaintiff cross-appealed.

The Appellate Division agreed with Defendant that the lower court erred in denying Defendant’s motion for summary judgment in dismissing the Labor Law causes of action because the Defendant was not considered an “owner” for purposes of the statutes. The accident occurred well outside the Defendant’s right-of-way, and the Defendant had no interest or legal control over the Landing Area. Further, the Landing Area was completely on the Co-Defendant’s private property, the Co-Defendant had given Plaintiff permission to park the backhoe there and directed Plaintiff on exactly where to park. The Defendant had no power to do the same and there were other options available for Plaintiff to park. Further, the Appellate Division determined Plaintiff’s accident did not have “an elevation-related risk,” as protected against in Labor Law § 240(1). The Appellate Division also agreed with Defendant in denying the common-law negligence causes of action. The Appellate Division found that since Defendant established it did not occupy, own, or have control over the area of the accident (the Landing Area), and did not employ this area for a special use, it did not owe Plaintiff a duty of care.

The Appellate Division therefore modified the Supreme Court’s order by granting the Defendant’s summary judgment and dismissing the cross claim against it. The court also modified the lower courts order by totally denying Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend, since there is no longer a basis against the town to do so.

The Appellate Division also agreed with Plaintiff in saying the lower court erred in dismissing the Labor Law and common-law negligence causes of action against the Co-Defendant. The Co-Defendants owned and controlled the accident area and did not establish that they did not have actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition. The court modified the lower court’s order by denying Co-Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

989 N.Y.S.2d 715 (4th Dep’t. 2014)

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