Kimso v Ghandi
This appeal addresses a party’s ability to amend a pleading following trial and the full presentation of proof by both parties. Counterclaim plaintiff, Mahesh Gandhi and his two associates formed and held equal one-third interests in three corporations. The corporations were given a twenty million dollar loan from the U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”), nine million dollars of that loan was loaned to the three associates as a shareholder loan—each associate made regular interest payments on that loan. Gandhi was removed as the corporations’ manager due to suspected misappropriation of funds. Gandhi filed a state action seeking to compel arbitration and the corporations filed a federal claim alleging multiple counts. Eventually, the parties reached a Settlement Agreement (“Agreement”) agreeing to end all actions and Gandhi sold his one-third interest, but no provision explicitly rid of Gandhi’s shareholder loan obligation.
The corporations stopped making payments to Gandhi after making twenty-three monthly payments during which Gandhi did not pay shareholder loan payments. The corporations filed an action seeking declaratory judgment to “offset the remaining amount they owed Gandhi under the Settlement Agreement against the money Gandhi owed the corporations on the shareholder loan notes.” Litigation continued, but both parties’ amended their pleadings. In the corporations’ amendment, they admitted they were “’joint and severally liable for the amounts due’. . .and ‘if Plaintiffs fail to make the full payments to Defendant as specified under Settlement Agreement, Defendant may allege that Plaintiffs are in default of the Settlement Agreement and that Defendant would be entitled to all his remedies.’” One month prior to trial, corporations filed motions to preclude Gandhi from presenting evidence/claiming payments due to him. The trial court deferred, but at trial allowed evidence about the agreement and back payments owed. Gandhi moved to conform the pleadings to align to the proof at trial, seeking to assert a counterclaim. The supreme court granted his motion, the corporations appealed and the appellate division reversed the trial court’s ruling—finding, the late amendment prejudiced the corporations. Gandhi appealed.
Here, the Court found that pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3025, a party is permitted to amend a pleading “‘at any time by leave of court . . . before or after judgment to conform [the pleading] to the evidence.’” Furthermore, the Court found that where there is no prejudice to the party opposing the amendment, the court should grant leave to amend. The court has great latitude in exercising discretion over applications to amend pleadings and may only be reversed where there is an abuse of discretion. Here, the court found the appellate division did abuse its discretion because there was no prejudice to the corporations that would support a denial of Gandhi’s request to amend. The Court found that because the corporations had stated in their amended complaint that the sum of money they owed should be reduced by the money Gandhi owed them—explicitly addressing potential back payments—they were not permitted to allege prejudice from Gandhi’s demand for payments due to him. This is because “facts admitted in a party’s pleadings constitute . . .admission, and are conclusive . . .” Furthermore, the Court found that the corporations had elicited evidence that was the basis of Gandhi’s claim.
The Court reversed and remitted the case to the appellate division.
998 N.Y.S.2d 740 (N.Y. 2014)