# U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND PRESIDENT OBAMA'S EXECUTIVE ORDER FOR DEFERRED ACTION

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#### INTRODUCTION

Both my parents were immigrants. I grew up in a working class suburb of Detroit where every family seemed to include at least one parent or grandparent who was an immigrant, from places all over the world including Mexico, Syria, and Iraq. So of course I admire and respect immigrants, as we all should, because every American is either an immigrant or the descendent of ancestors who came here from

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somewhere else. And we are told that even includes Native Americans.

Whether we should admire and respect immigrants is not what the immigration controversy is really about. Given that we should admire and respect immigrants, the question at the heart of the controversy is, how many should we take? And specifically, should we accept everyone in the world who wants to come to the United States to live and work? Or alternatively, should we try to enforce a numerical limit on how many immigrants we accept every year?

That is a binary choice, either no limits, or an enforced limit. And it is a hard choice, especially for our elected officials, because advocating no limits does not sound like a path to election or re-election. But trying to enforce a numerical limit presents numerous administrative challenges, and requires a willingness to turn away people who are neither criminals nor national security threats, who just want to work hard for a better life for themselves and their families, and who remind us of our own ancestors. And if they come anyway in violation of our numerical limit, we have to try to remove them to defend the numerical limit. Can we do that?

Many lawyers like to think they can argue both sides of any controversy, and I am no exception. I can make the historical, philosophical, libertarian, economic, and religious arguments for open borders. But I can also, and do, defend the decision of Congress to enforce a numerical limit on immigration.

Although it has become a cliché to say that everyone agrees that our immigration system is broken, I do not agree with that. I believe that what is broken is our willingness to make the hard choice between simply allowing unlimited immigration, as we did for the first century of the republic, or alternatively enforcing a numerical limit on immigration, with all the attendant difficulty, complexity, and expense that entails.

It is perhaps understandable that many citizens including elected officials keep looking for a third, easier choice. Open borders without a limit on immigration would strike many citizens as dangerous, and many politicians as political suicide. But the alternative of having to turn away and remove would-be immigrants, who remind us of our own ancestors, in order to enforce a numerical limitation on immigration strikes many citizens as equally unappealing.

How about this for a third choice? We can pretend we have a numerical limit, keep it on the books, but not enforce it. And whenever that policy choice produces a large number of illegal immigrants, we can just enact a big amnesty or legalization. How does that sound? What message would such a policy send to those considering legal or illegal immigration to the United States?

If we do nothing at all to reform our immigration system, we are left with the most generous legal immigration system in the world, issuing every year more green cards for legal permanent immigrants with a clear path to full citizenship than all the rest of the nations of the world combined.<sup>1</sup> In testimony to the Judiciary Committee of the U.S. Senate in 2013, I described that immigration system as worthy of our nation of immigrants.<sup>2</sup> But it needs to be defended and enforced to deter excess illegal immigration, unless we prefer the alternative of unlimited immigration. And Congress can adjust the numerical limit to be enforced at any time as long as we are committed to enforcing it.

From the start of his administration in 2009, President Obama has advocated and supported a set of changes to U.S. statutory immigration law, including legalization and a pathway to citizenship for most illegal aliens in the United States. He has labeled this set of changes to U.S. immigration law as "comprehensive immigration reform."<sup>3</sup>

Because President Obama was unable to persuade Congress to enact the package of changes to U.S. immigration law that he advocated, he decided to use unilateral executive orders to circumvent Congress and advance some of those changes. On June 15, 2012, less than four months before a presidential election, President Obama announced Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) to provide both deferred action and work authorization for all illegal aliens who came to the United States before age sixteen.<sup>4</sup> DACA was implemented through memoranda from Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano to her subordinates, and has, as of 2015, formalized the status of approximately seven hundred thousand beneficiaries.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1.</sup> Jan Ting, Does the U.S. Issue More Green Cards for Permanent Legal Immigration than All the Rest of the Nations of the World Combined?, NEWSWORKS: BRANDYWINE TO BROAD (Sept. 7, 2015), http://www.newsworks.org/index.php/blogs/brandywine-to-broad/ item/85940-does-the-us-issue-more-green-cards-for-permanent-legal-immigration-than-all-the-rest-of-the-nations-of-the-world-combined.

<sup>2.</sup> Building an Immigration System Worthy of American Values: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 14 (2013) (statement of Jan C. Ting, Professor, Temple University Beasley School of Law). See also id. at 230–38.

<sup>3.</sup> Barack Obama, President, U.S., Remarks by the President on Comprehensive Immigration Reform (July 1, 2010), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-comprehensive-immigration-reform.

<sup>4.</sup> Julia Preston & John H. Cushman, Jr., *Obama to Permit Young Migrants to Remain in U.S.*, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/16/us/us-to-stop-deporting-some-illegal-immigrants.html?pagewanted=all&\_r=1.

<sup>5.</sup> *See* Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec'y, Dep't Homeland Sec., to David V. Aguilar, Comm'r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., et al. 1–3 (June 15, 2012), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-

On November 20, 2014, two weeks after congressional elections in which Republicans won control of the U.S. Senate from Democrats and widened their majority in the U.S. House of Representatives, President Obama announced Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Legal Permanent Residents (DAPA) to provide deferred action and work authorization to an estimated five million additional illegal aliens.<sup>6</sup> A federal district court injunction has prevented DAPA from being implemented.<sup>7</sup> The injunction has been upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.<sup>8</sup> The Obama Administration has announced that it will not further appeal the injunction and will proceed to litigation on the merits of the challenge to DAPA by Texas and twenty-five other states.<sup>9</sup>

Anyone who follows the news knows that the world is awash in uninvited migrants. Australia and Western Europe, even Israel, are trying to cope, just like the United States, with a wave of migration. Some migrants qualify as true refugees under international law. But many, though fleeing lives of hardship, do not. And some are simply seeking a better life than the one they left behind.

In the United States we have a simple solution to the paradox of unauthorized migration. We let our elected representatives in Congress decide how many and which of the migrants are allowed to stay, and also what to do with those not allowed to stay. This Article will discuss why President Obama's latest deferred action executive order, DAPA, is unwise and bad policy, the unintended tax consequences of such an order, and why the order is lacking in legal authority and unconstitutional.

came-to-us-as-children.pdf; Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 606 (S.D. Tex. 2015), *aff*<sup>3</sup>d, No. 15-40238, 2015 WL 6873190 (5th Cir. Nov. 9, 2015).

<sup>6.</sup> Michael D. Shear, *Obama, Daring Congress, Acts to Overhaul Immigration*, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/21/us/obama-immigration-speech.html. *See also* Barack Obama, President, U.S., Remarks by the President on Immigration—Chicago, IL (Nov. 25, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/25/remarks-president-immigration-chicago-il (the failure of Congress to act on the immigration reform President Obama sought prompted him to "change the law").

<sup>7.</sup> Texas, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 677-78.

<sup>8.</sup> Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733, 769 (5th Cir. 2015).

<sup>9.</sup> David Sherfinski, Justice Won't Appeal Amnesty Injunction to Supreme Court, WASH. TIMES (May 27, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/may/27/greg-abbott-minuscule-likelihood-obama-immigration/?page=all.

#### **Immigration and Deferred Action**

### I. PRESIDENT OBAMA'S DEFERRED ACTION PLAN IS UNWISE AND BAD POLICY

Ever since Congress began to limit the number of immigrants into the United States, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that protecting American workers was one of Congress's "great" or "primary" purposes. In 1929, the Court in *Karnuth v. United States* found that, "[t]he various acts of Congress since 1916 evince a progressive policy of restricting immigration. The history of this legislation points clearly to the conclusion that one of its great purposes was to protect American labor against the influx of foreign labor."<sup>10</sup> A half century later, in *Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB*, the Court held that a "primary purpose in restricting immigration is . . . preserv[ation of] jobs for American workers."<sup>11</sup>

What is the impact of an executive order that adds five million illegal immigrant workers to the labor market in America? How does that affect the job prospects of the eight million unemployed Americans (of whom 2.2 million are long-term unemployed) and the 6.5 million involuntary part-time American workers who want but cannot find full-time work, and the 624,000 discouraged workers who have stopped looking for work?<sup>12</sup> How does the addition of five million illegal immigrant workers to the American labor market affect the future prospects for the nearly forty-six million Americans, almost one in six, who are receiving food stamps?<sup>13</sup> And how will giving five million illegal immigrants work authorization affect the groups with the highest unemployment rates? The official unemployment rate is still 5.1%, six years after the official end of the Great Recession, but it is 9.5% for African Americans, 16.9% for American teenagers, and 31.3% for African-American teenagers.<sup>14</sup> Can we all agree that is an outrage, and that the shortage of jobs for Americans is at the root of the concern that "Black Lives Matter"?

Wages remain stagnant, and even employed Americans feel job insecurity. President Obama says that rising income inequality is tearing at the social fabric of America. Indeed, even while wages stagnate, corporate profits are up and the stock market is hitting new record highs seemingly every week. Does adding five million illegal immigrant

<sup>10. 279</sup> U.S. 231, 243 (1929).

<sup>11. 467</sup> U.S. 883, 893 (1984).

<sup>12.</sup> News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, USDL-15-1697, The Emp't Situation—Aug. 2015, 1, 1–2 (Sept. 4, 2015), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit\_09042015.pdf.

<sup>13.</sup> See Matt Trivisonno, Food Stamps Charts, MATT TRIVISONNO'S BLOG, http://www.trivisonno.com/food-stamps-charts (last updated Oct. 9, 2015).

<sup>14.</sup> News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, *supra* note 12, at 1, 11 tbl.A-1, 12 tbl.A-2.

workers to the legal work force increase or decrease economic inequality in America?

Let's consider the millions of people abroad who might be considering illegal immigration to the United States. How does President Obama's granting of work authorization to five million illegal immigrants affect them? The poor people of the world may be poor, but they are not stupid. They are as capable as anyone else of using costbenefit analysis to determine what is in their self-interest, and they do it all the time. If we want to deter them from illegally immigrating to the United States, we should raise the costs of doing so—through more enforcement—and we should reduce the benefits. Conversely, if we want to encourage more illegal immigration, we should lower the costs through less enforcement and increase the benefits by providing work authorization—exactly as President Obama has just done in his executive order.

Finally, what is the impact of President Obama's executive order on qualified legal immigrants to the United States? Many recently arrived legal immigrants will have to compete for jobs with the newly work-authorized five million illegal immigrants. And what of the millions of qualified immigrants still waiting outside the United States for their chance to immigrate legally? Because the number of immigrant visas available each year is limited, some immigrants eager to come here legally have been waiting outside the United States for a visa for more than twenty years. How do they feel when they see that those who entered illegally as recently as five years ago are now going to be rewarded with work authorization and deferred action? Does the executive order make them feel like fools for respecting American law instead of violating it?<sup>15</sup>

## II. INSTEAD OF PAYING TAXES, ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS RECEIVING WORK Authorization Under President Obama's Executive Order May Receive Refundable Earned Income Tax Credits, Even for Prior Years When Working Illegally

The earned income tax credit (EITC) is a refundable tax credit for qualifying low-income taxpayers, in effect a transfer of wealth to them from higher income taxpayers, an anti-poverty program built into the Internal Revenue Code. The EITC was originally enacted in 1975, and has been expanded several times since so that some qualifying low-

<sup>15.</sup> See Onuora Amobi, A Legal Immigrant's American Dream; It's Hard Not to See Amnesty for Illegal Immigrants as a Betrayal of all Those Who Were Denied Legal Entry, WALL ST. J. (June 29, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/a-legal-immigrants-american-dream-1435261265 (perspective of the legal immigrant).

income taxpayers with children can today get EITC benefits in the form of tax refunds exceeding six thousand dollars.<sup>16</sup>

To qualify for the EITC, taxpayers must provide valid Social Security numbers for themselves and their children. This requirement disqualifies non-citizens who are working in the United States in violation of U.S. immigration law. Undocumented aliens cannot obtain valid Social Security numbers.

Supporters of amnesty for illegal immigrants and President Obama's deferred action plan have argued that illegal immigrants need employment authorization so they can pay taxes like everyone else. In fact many beneficiaries of deferred action may not have to pay taxes, and may in fact qualify for a large payment from the U.S. Treasury in the form of a refundable earned income tax credit.

Furthermore, a little-known ruling, by obscure officials of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in the last year of the Clinton Administration, opened the door to illegal aliens claiming and receiving EITC benefits even for years when they are undocumented.

On June 9, 2000, a *Chief Counsel Advice* was published in the name of "Mary Oppenheimer, Acting Assistant Chief Counsel (Employee Benefits)," though it was signed by "Mark Schwimmer, Senior Technician Reviewer."<sup>17</sup> This document advises IRS employees that illegal aliens who are disqualified from receiving the EITC can retroactively receive EITC benefits for years worked without a valid Social Security number if, after receiving a valid Social Security number, they file an amended return for the previous years worked. This document is still available through the official IRS website.<sup>18</sup>

Thus, illegal aliens who obtain work authorization, either by qualifying for a legal visa or by executive order from the President, and who then obtain a valid Social Security number, can apparently claim the EITC for previous years worked without a Social Security number as long as such claims are not barred by a statute of limitations, generally within three years.

The document does state that, "Chief Counsel Advice is not binding on Examination or Appeals and is not a final case determination. This

<sup>16.</sup> See generally 26 U.S.C. § 32 (2012).

<sup>17.</sup> Memorandum from Acting Assistant Chief Counsel (Employee Benefits), Office of Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Serv., U.S. Dep't of the Treasury on Claiming Previously Denied Earned Income Credit Due to Invalid Social Security Numbers to Candice V. Cromling, Earned Income Tax Credit Program Manager, Internal Revenue Serv., U.S. Dep't of the Treasury 1, 4 (June 9, 2000), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/0028034.pdf.

<sup>18.</sup> Id. at 1-2.

document is not to be cited as precedent."<sup>19</sup> But for an advisor to someone who previously worked illegally, but who now has work authorization and a Social Security number, the published IRS document is sufficient authority for filing amended or new tax returns to claim the EITC for previous tax years not barred by a statute of limitations. This is so even though the ruling appears to be in conflict with the language and the intent of the Internal Revenue Code that the EITC should not be paid to anyone working without a Social Security number.

I encourage members of Congress to determine the net impact on the U.S. Treasury of allowing five million illegal immigrants to qualify for refundable tax credits including the EITC and the Child Tax Credit.<sup>20</sup>

### III. PRESIDENT OBAMA'S EXECUTIVE ORDER FOR DEFERRED ACTION FOR Illegal Aliens Announced November 20, 2014, Is Both Unconstitutional and Without Legal Authority

President Obama has repeatedly and publicly stated that he, as president, does not have the constitutional power or legal authority to issue an executive order deferring the removal of illegal aliens.<sup>21</sup> Representative Robert Goodlatte, Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, played a video compilation of President Obama's denials of his legal and constitutional authority to issue such an executive order at that Committee's December 2, 2014 hearing on President Obama's Executive Overreach on Immigration.<sup>22</sup>

President Obama is a lawyer and former teacher of constitutional law at the University of Chicago Law School, and thus understands the meaning and significance of the words he uses. He deserves to be believed when he states that he lacks legal and constitutional authority to defer the removal of illegal aliens by executive order.

The basic reason why President Obama's unilateral executive immigration order is illegal and unconstitutional is that it violates the fundamental concept of the U.S. Constitution—that we the people govern ourselves through our elected representatives through a deliberative process of checks and balances, not through the unilateral pronouncements of one "great leader" as in North Korea.

<sup>19.</sup> Id. at 1.

<sup>20. 26</sup> U.S.C. § 24 (2012).

<sup>21.</sup> Matt Wolking, 22 Times Obama Said He Couldn't Ignore or Create His Own Immigration Law (Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.speaker.gov/general/22-times-president-obama-said-he-couldn-t-ignore-or-create-his-own-immigration-law.

<sup>22.</sup> President Obama's Executive Overreach on Immigration: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 1–2 (2014).

The Supreme Court is the ultimate judge of how the Constitution divides the power of government between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. Article I, section 8, of the Constitution empowers Congress "to establish an Uniform Rule of Naturalization."<sup>23</sup> Concerning article I, section 8 and U.S. immigration policy, the Court has held that:

- "Congress has plenary power to make rules for the admission of aliens and to exclude those who possess those characteristics which Congress has forbidden,"<sup>24</sup>
- the "formulation" of "[p]olicies pertaining to the entry of aliens and their right to remain here" is "entrusted exclusively to Congress,"<sup>25</sup>
- "over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete,"<sup>26</sup>
- "Congress supplies the conditions of the privilege of entry into the United States" unless that power has been "lawfully placed with the President" by Congress,<sup>27</sup> and
- the exclusive authority of Congress to formulate immigration policy "has become about as firmly [e]mbedded in the legislative and judicial tissue[] of our body politic as any aspect of our government."<sup>28</sup>

President Obama relies upon a November 19, 2014, thirty-three page opinion from the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) at the U.S. Department of Justice for its conclusion that the deferred action program he has announced "would constitute a permissible exercise of [the Department of Homeland Security's] enforcement discretion under the [Immigration and Nationality Act]."<sup>29</sup> In reaching that conclusion, the Office of Legal Counsel relied on the Supreme Court's decision in *Heckler v. Chaney*, a case involving the Food and Drug Administration, for the proposition that an agency's decision not to take enforcement action should be presumed immune from judicial review under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA).<sup>30</sup>

<sup>23.</sup> U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.

<sup>24.</sup> Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 123 (1967).

<sup>25.</sup> Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954).

<sup>26.</sup> Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909).

<sup>27.</sup> Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543 (1950).

<sup>28.</sup> Galvan, 347 U.S. at 531.

<sup>29.</sup> The Dep't of Homeland Sec. Auth. to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully Present in the U.S. & to Defer Removal of Others, 38 Op. O.L.C., Nov. 19, 2014, at 31, http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/attachments/2014/11/20/2014-11-19-auth-prioritize-removal.pdf [hereinafter OLC Opinion].

<sup>30.</sup> Id. at 4 (citing 470 U.S. 821 (1985)).

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But the Supreme Court in *Heckler* also said this:

In so stating, we emphasize that the decision is only presumptively unreviewable; the presumption may be rebutted where the substantive statute has provided guidelines for the agency to follow in exercising its enforcement powers. Thus, in establishing this presumption in the APA, Congress did not set agencies free to disregard legislative direction in the statutory scheme that the agency administers. Congress may limit an agency's exercise of enforcement power if it wishes, either by setting substantive priorities, or by otherwise circumscribing an agency's power to discriminate among issues or cases it will pursue.<sup>31</sup>

I believe that each component of the immigration executive order announced on November 19, 2014, violates substantive priorities of Congress as expressed by statute.

### A. The Deferred Action Exceeds the Statutory Bounds of Prosecutorial Discretion

Section 115 of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), enacted by Congress and signed into law by President Reagan, declared it to be the "sense of Congress" that "the immigration laws of the United States should be enforced vigorously and uniformly."<sup>32</sup>

Ten years later, out of concern that those laws were not being enforced "vigorously" enough, Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA).<sup>33</sup> Among the reforms ordered by Congress in IIRIRA were new limits on the discretion of the Executive Branch to defer initiation of removal proceedings against aliens who are present without having ever been legally admitted.<sup>34</sup>

Specifically, Congress declared in new section 235(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)<sup>35</sup> (codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1)) that every alien present in the United States without having been admitted "shall be deemed for purposes of this [Act] an applicant for admission."<sup>36</sup> And Congress also specified in section 235(b)(2) that "in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining

<sup>31.</sup> Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832–33.

<sup>32.</sup> Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986).

<sup>33.</sup> *See* Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).

<sup>34.</sup> Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 § 239, 8 U.S.C. § 1229 (2012).

<sup>35.</sup> Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 235(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1) (2012).

<sup>36.</sup> *Id.* § 235(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1).

immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a [removal] proceeding under section [240]."<sup>37</sup>

In August of 2012, ten Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers and agents filed a lawsuit against the Secretary of Homeland Security in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas.<sup>38</sup> The officers and agents claimed that they had been threatened with disciplinary action if, in compliance with section 235 of INA,<sup>39</sup> they detained or attempted to remove any illegal alien who claimed to be eligible for DACA.<sup>40</sup> In other words, the Secretary had decreed that immigration officers *shall not* do what a statute recently enacted by Congress plainly stated that they *shall* do.<sup>41</sup>

In April of 2013, the federal court held that section 235 of INA<sup>42</sup> "mandates the initiation of removal proceedings whenever an immigration officer encounters an illegal alien who is not 'clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.""<sup>43</sup> Concerning the ICE officers' lawsuit, the judge found that the officers "were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the Department of Homeland Security has implemented a program contrary to congressional mandate."44 Unfortunately for these officers, the court then dismissed the complaint on the technical grounds that the officers must first seek relief under the mandatory collective bargaining process for federal employees.<sup>45</sup> The Fifth Circuit, in its affirmation of the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims, conducted a de novo review of the issue of standing and found that plaintiffs lacked standing for failure to demonstrate sufficiently concrete and particularized injury.<sup>46</sup> But the fact remains that the district court, in reviewing the legality of the President's deferredaction policies, found that they were "likely" to be illegal.<sup>47</sup>

<sup>37.</sup> Id. § 235(b)(2)(A), 8. U.S.C. § 1225 (b)(2)(A).

<sup>38.</sup> Complaint at 1, Crane v. Napolitano, 920 F. Supp. 2d. 724 (N.D. Tex. 2013) (No. 3:12-cv-03247-O).

<sup>39.</sup> INA § 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1225.

<sup>40.</sup> Complaint at 10, Crane, 920 F. Supp. 2d. 724 (No. 3:12-cv-03247-O).

<sup>41.</sup> Id. at 13.

<sup>42.</sup> INA § 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1225.

<sup>43.</sup> Crane v. Napolitano, No. 3:12-cv-03247-O, 2013 WL 1744422, at \*5 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2013).

<sup>44.</sup> Crane v. Napolitano, No. 3:12-cv-03247-O, 2013 WL 8311660, at \*1 (N.D. Tex. July 31, 2013).

<sup>45.</sup> *Id.* at \*4.

<sup>46.</sup> Crane v. Johnson, 783 F.3d 244 (5th Cir. 2015).

<sup>47.</sup> Crane v. Napolitano, No. 3:12-cv-03247-O, 2013 WL 8311660, at \*3 (N.D. Tex. July 31, 2013).

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A large part of the Office of Legal Counsel Opinion is devoted to reciting instances of deferrals of immigration enforcement action by former Presidents, which the Opinion treats as precedents for President Obama's own deferred-action program.<sup>48</sup> In fact none of the alleged precedents, which were short-term and involved limited numbers of very specific categories of aliens, were ever subject to judicial review, so their value as constitutional precedent cannot be assumed.<sup>49</sup> In any event, even if these prior actions were lawful, they are readily distinguished from the President's proposal to defer the detention and removal of nearly five million illegal aliens.

Many instances of presidential discretion in the expulsion of alien groups are no longer relevant because Congress reacted to them by expressly limiting or removing that discretion. For example, prior to the Immigration Act of 1990, the U.S. Attorney General, at the request of the Secretary of State, would on occasion extend the enforced departure date for certain nationals from a particular country ("extended voluntary departure" or "EVD").<sup>50</sup> The Immigration Act of 1990 sought to circumscribe that practice by establishing a statutory Temporary Protected Status (TPS) program that it defined as the "exclusive authority" of the Attorney General to permit deportable aliens to remain in the United States on account of their nationality.<sup>51</sup> The Attorney General's authority was assigned to the new Secretary of Homeland Security by the Homeland Security Act of 2002.<sup>52</sup>

Subsequent to passage of the Immigration Act of 1990, neither the Attorney General nor the Secretary of Homeland Security has granted EVD to aliens based upon their nationality. However, presidents since then have still, on occasion, ordered a deferral of enforced departure ("deferred enforced departure" or "DED") for certain nationality groups. The post-1990 DEDs ordered by President Obama and his predecessors arguably contradict the Immigration Act's "exclusive authority" provision. However, these extraordinary deferrals of removal and grants of employment authorization have been explicitly justified as an exercise of the President's constitutional authority to conduct the nation's foreign affairs.

The field of foreign affairs is an area in which Congress may "accord

<sup>48.</sup> OLC Opinion, *supra* note 29, at 14, 20.

<sup>49.</sup> *Id.* 

<sup>50.</sup> RUTH ELLEN WASEM & KARMA ESTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20844, TEMPORARY PROTECTED STATUS: CURRENT IMMIGRATION POLICY AND ISSUES 4 (2011).

<sup>51.</sup> Immigration Act of 1990 § 244A(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(g) (2012).

<sup>52.</sup> Homeland Security Act of 2002 § 402(4), 6 U.S.C. § 202(4) (2002).

to the President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved."<sup>53</sup> Concerning immigration in particular, the Court has recognized that the power to exclude aliens "is inherent in the executive power to control the foreign affairs of the nation," and for that reason "Congress may in broad terms authorize the executive to exercise the power."<sup>54</sup>

Whether any or all of the post-1990 DEDs fall within that "degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved" may be an important legal question, but the post-1990 DEDs and their constitutionality are irrelevant to the legality of President Obama's deferred action program, since he has not justified the program as compelled by "foreign policy reasons," but instead as an exercise of "prosecutorial discretion" in response to an imbalance between the number of immigration lawbreakers and the amount of immigration law-enforcement resources.<sup>55</sup>

A review of the deferral actions cited in the OLC Opinion indicates that they applied to limited classes of people, mostly those whose departure was impeded by events outside their control or who had been entitled by Congress to remain in the United States but needed more time to complete the application process. The example seemingly most helpful to the Administration's case is the 1990 Family Fairness program implemented under President George H.W. Bush to grant "voluntary departure" ("VD") to some of the spouses and children of illegal aliens who had been authorized by IRCA in 1986 to apply for and receive permanent residence.<sup>56</sup>

President Bush regarded these individuals as victims of an oversight in the drafting of IRCA and worked with Congress to fix it, achieving the fix as part of the Immigration Act of 1990, which provided legal immigrant visas to such spouses and children.<sup>57</sup> The enactment by Congress of this legislation within months of the announcement of the Family Fairness initiative demonstrates the close consultation between the Bush Administration and Congress, and the concurrence of Congress in efforts to fix the particular problem.

As Justice Jackson famously wrote in *Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer*, "[w]hen the President acts pursuant to an express or implied

<sup>53.</sup> United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).

<sup>54.</sup> Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542-43 (1950).

<sup>55.</sup> See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320.

<sup>56.</sup> OLC Opinion, *supra* note 29, at 6.

<sup>57.</sup> Immigration Act of 1990 § 132(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012).

authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum," but, "[w]hen the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb."<sup>58</sup>

The OLC Opinion itself acknowledges that "the Executive cannot, under the guise of exercising enforcement discretion, attempt to effectively rewrite the laws to match its policy preferences."<sup>59</sup> My conclusion is that the precedents cited in the OLC Opinion are distinguishable, and that President Obama, "under the guise of exercising enforcement discretion" is engaged in an "attempt to effectively rewrite the laws to match its policy preferences."<sup>60</sup>

### B. Grants of "Advance Parole" to Deferred Action Beneficiaries, Like Those to DACA Beneficiaries, Exceed the President's Authority

Although the Administration has not formally announced whether beneficiaries of the President's expanded deferred-action program will also be eligible for "advance parole," that is likely to be the case given that the beneficiaries of the expanded program have otherwise been treated the same as DACA beneficiaries.<sup>61</sup>

The President's "parole" authority originated as an exception to the limits on the number and categories of aliens who could be admitted to the United States on a temporary or permanent basis under the INA. The parole authority, now codified at section 212(d)(5), authorizes the President to "parole" into the United States an otherwise inadmissible alien "only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit."<sup>62</sup>

According to the House Judiciary Committee in 1996 when that restrictive language was added to the statute:

Parole should only be given on a case-by-case basis for specified urgent humanitarian reasons, such as life-threatening humanitarian medical emergencies, or for specified public interest reasons, such as assisting the government in a law-enforcement-related activity. It should not be used to circumvent Congressionally-established immigration policy or to admit aliens who do not qualify for admission under established legal immigration categories.<sup>63</sup>

<sup>58. 343</sup> U.S. 579, 635–36 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).

<sup>59.</sup> OLC Opinion, *supra* note 29, at 6.

<sup>60.</sup> *Id*.

<sup>61.</sup> U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., *Frequently Asked Questions*, U.S. DEP'T HOMELAND SECURITY (June 15, 2015), http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-process/frequently-asked-questions#travel.

<sup>62.</sup> Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 § 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1965).

<sup>63.</sup> H.R. REP. NO. 104-469, at 141 (1996).

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Could any federal court hold that DACA parole or parole granted to deferred action beneficiaries is not being used "to admit aliens who do not qualify for admission under established legal immigration categories"?<sup>64</sup> On U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) Form I-131 issued in 2013, the USCIS asserts "in its discretion" that DACA beneficiaries may be granted advance parole to travel outside the United States for educational or employment purposes, though not authorized by Congress in INA section 212(d)(5).<sup>65</sup>

The reason the Administration wants to and will also abuse the parole statute in the case of the newly deferred five million illegal aliens is to provide them with a pathway to a green card and citizenship, contrary to the ardent representations that the deferred action is not a pathway to citizenship. Here is how that is going to work:

Unlike most of the DACA beneficiaries, most of the new deferred action beneficiaries will eventually qualify as immediate relatives of U.S. citizens, since most qualify for deferred action because they are parents of U.S. citizens or permanent residents who will become U.S. citizens.<sup>66</sup>

Since immediate relative visas are not limited numerically, there is no waiting list, and they are immediately available. Any alien who qualifies for an immigrant visa which is currently available can apply for and claim it at a U.S. consulate abroad.<sup>67</sup> But if the deferred action beneficiaries try to do that, most would be barred from re-entering the United States because their illegal presence in the United States for more than one year makes them inadmissible for ten years upon their departure from the United States.<sup>68</sup>

There is a statute that allows some aliens who are in the United States already to claim available immigrant visas in the United States, without departing from the United States or triggering the statutory tenyear inadmissibility bar. But that statute providing "adjustment of status" is only available to aliens "admitted or paroled" into the United States, and those who have entered illicitly without inspection do not qualify.<sup>69</sup>

Here is why advance parole is the magic bullet which clears the

<sup>64.</sup> *Id.* 

<sup>65.</sup> U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., FORM I-131 INSTRUCTIONS 4 (Mar. 31, 2013); see INA § 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5).

<sup>66.</sup> U.S. citizen children cannot sponsor their parents for immediate relative green cards until the children attain age twenty-one. INA § 201, 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i).

<sup>67.</sup> Bureau of Consumer Affairs, *The Immigrant Visa Process*, U.S. DEP'T ST. (Oct. 16, 2015), http://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/immigrate/immigrant-process/interview/after. html.

<sup>68.</sup> INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II).

<sup>69.</sup> INA § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a).

pathway to citizenship for most deferred action beneficiaries when they qualify as immediate relatives:

The Board of Immigration Appeals, a branch of the U.S. Department of Justice, ruled in 2012 in *In re Arrabally*, that despite prior illegal presence in the United States, an alien departing from the United States with an advance parole allowing re-entry is not a departure under INA section  $212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II)^{70}$  which would trigger the ten-year inadmissibility bar.<sup>71</sup>

And, upon returning to the United States with an advance parole, the alien having been "paroled" now magically satisfies the threshold requirement of section 245 and qualifies for adjustment of status, and can claim the immediate relative visa or any other immediately available visa without leaving the United States.<sup>72</sup>

So the representations of the Administration that the deferred action initiative does not provide a pathway to citizenship will likely be false for most of the beneficiaries.

### C. The Issuance of Employment Authorization Documents to Deferred Action Beneficiaries Exceeds the President's Authority

The OLC Opinion identifies three features of President Obama's initiative that even it concedes are "somewhat unusual among exercises of enforcement discretion": open toleration of an undocumented alien's continued presence in the United States for a fixed period of time, the ability to seek employment authorization and suspend unlawful presence for purposes of section 212(a)(9)(B) and (C) of the INA,<sup>73</sup> and the invitation to individuals who satisfy specified criteria to apply for deferred action status.<sup>74</sup>

Regarding the ability to seek employment authorization, the OLC Opinion argues that Congress itself bestowed upon the executive branch unlimited authority to issue Employment Authorization Documents (EADs) to illegal alien workers when it enacted the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.<sup>75</sup>

New section 274A(a) of the INA, added by IRCA in 1986, makes it unlawful "to hire, or to recruit or refer for a fee, for employment in the

<sup>70.</sup> INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II).

<sup>71. 25</sup> I&N Dec. 771, 771 (Bd. of Immigration Appeals Aug. 16, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/intdec/vol25/3748%20%28final%29.pdf.

<sup>72.</sup> INA § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a).

<sup>73.</sup> INA § 212(a)(9)(B)–(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)–(C).

<sup>74.</sup> OLC Opinion, *supra* note 29, at 20–22, 21–22 n.11.

<sup>75.</sup> *Id.* at 21–22 n.11.

United States an alien knowing the alien is an unauthorized alien."<sup>76</sup> The term "unauthorized aliens" was defined at section 274A(h)(3) as all aliens other than aliens authorized to work "under this Act or by the Attorney General."<sup>77</sup> A federal regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12, contains a list of the categories of aliens who are not "unauthorized aliens" and who may therefore qualify for Employment Authorization.<sup>78</sup>

According to the OLC Opinion, the Attorney General has interpreted the clause "by the Attorney General" as conferring unlimited discretion to use "the regulatory process" to except any class of alien from the definition of "unauthorized alien."<sup>79</sup> According to the OLC Opinion, the exception applicable to illegal aliens awarded deferred action under the President's new program is found at 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14), which refers to aliens who have been granted "deferred action, defined as an act of administrative convenience to the government which gives some cases lower priority, if the alien establishes an economic necessity for employment."<sup>80</sup>

A 2007 memorandum from the USCIS Ombudsman says that C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) had a more modest scope: "There is no statutory basis for deferred action . . . . According to informal USCIS estimates, the vast majority of cases in which deferred action is granted involve medical grounds."<sup>81</sup> So narrowly based a regulation, having no basis in the statute, cannot serve as authority for the indiscriminate issuance of millions of EADs contemplated by the President's new deferred-action program. While the courts must normally defer to a Secretary's interpretation of his own regulations, this does not apply when an "alternative reading is compelled by the regulation's plain language or by other indications of the Secretary's intent at the time of the regulation's promulgation."<sup>82</sup>

Whether or not that regulation was ever intended to have the colossal scope attributed to it by the OLC Opinion, the more important question is whether a regulation of that scope is in fact authorized by INA section 274A(h)(3).<sup>83</sup> In other words, when Congress wrote and passed the IRCA

82. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 500 (1994) (quoting Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 430 (1988)).

<sup>76.</sup> INA § 274A(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A).

<sup>77.</sup> INA § 274A(h)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3).

<sup>78. 8</sup> C.F.R. § 274a.12 (2012).

<sup>79.</sup> OLC Opinion, supra note 29, at 21.

<sup>80. 8</sup> C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14); OLC Opinion, supra note 29, at 22.

<sup>81.</sup> Recommendation from Prakash Khatri, Citizenship & Immigration Servs. Ombudsman to Emilio T. Gonzalez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. 1 (Apr. 6, 2007), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/CISOmbudsman\_RR\_32\_O\_Deferred\_Action\_04-06-07.pdf.

<sup>83.</sup> INA § 274A(h)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3) (2012).

in 1986, were the four words "by the Attorney General" inserted into the statute to empower the President to grant EADs to unlimited numbers of aliens, including millions of the very illegal alien workers whose employment IRCA was intended to prevent?

According to Chapman University law professor John C. Eastman, ascribing any such intention to Congress would be illogical. Had Congress intended the phrase "or by the Attorney General" to confer such broad and potentially limitless discretion on the executive branch, then,

none of the carefully circumscribed exemptions would be necessary... [T]he... more likely interpretation of that phrase is that it refers back to other specific exemptions in Sections 1101 or 1324a that specify when the Attorney General [or Secretary of Homeland Security] might grant a visa for temporary lawful status.<sup>84</sup>

In other words, section 274A(h)(3)'s reference to aliens authorized to work "by the Attorney General" has a more obvious and rational explanation than a carte blanche to invite the whole world to work here.<sup>85</sup> As noted above, the INA provides for the issuance of specified numbers and categories of immigrant and nonimmigrant visas and prescribes which of those visas entitles the alien to work in the United States. At the same time, the INA authorizes the entry and residence of various categories of aliens without visas, including refugees, asylum applicants, and aliens eligible for TPS. In those cases, the INA separately authorizes or requires the Attorney General to provide the aliens with EADs.<sup>86</sup> As Professor Eastman reasons, "by the Attorney General" surely refers to those statutory authorizations and not to wholesale surrender to the President of the Congress's otherwise exclusive authority to determine whether an alien may enter, remain, or work in the United States.<sup>87</sup>

Post-IRCA legislation is consistent with Professor Eastman's analysis. On at least three occasions in the two decades after IRCA became law, Congress has enacted immigration legislation providing that the Attorney General (or the Secretary of Homeland Security) "may authorize" a class of aliens "to engage in employment in the United

<sup>84.</sup> John C. Eastman, *President Obama's 'Flexible' View of the Law: The DREAM Act as Case Study*, ROLL CALL (Aug. 28, 2014, 11:38 AM), http://www.rollcall.com/news/ Obamas-Flexible-View-of-the-Law-The-DREAM-Act-as-Case-Study-235892-1.html?pg= 2&dczone=opinion.

<sup>85.</sup> INA § 274A(h)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1234a(h)(3).

<sup>86.</sup> *See*, *e.g.*, INA § 208(c)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(1)(B) (2015) (asylum); INA § 244(a)(1)(A)–(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(a)(1)(A)–(B) (temporary protected status); INA § 244, 8 U.S.C. § 1738 (refugees).

<sup>87.</sup> Eastman, *supra* note 84.

States."<sup>88</sup> The aliens that might be authorized to work included "battered spouses," as well as certain nationals of Cuba, Haiti, and Nicaragua.<sup>89</sup> Why would Congress pass bills granting the executive branch discretionary authority to issue EADs to such narrowly defined categories of aliens if Congress had already empowered the Executive Branch in 1986 with discretion to issue EADs to anyone in the world?

To summarize, the question presented by INA section 274(h)(3)<sup>90</sup> is whether the more reasonable interpretation of IRCA's reference to "by the Attorney General" was that (1) Congress intended to exclude from the definition of "unauthorized alien" those aliens for whom the Attorney General was permitted or required by IRCA and numerous other provisions of the INA to issue EADs, or (2) Congress intended to empower the President to nullify IRCA with the stroke of his pen by granting EADs to the very aliens whose employment IRCA was enacted to prevent. The question answers itself. To quote the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, an Executive Branch procedure that exposes American workers to substandard wages and working conditions "cannot be the result Congress intended."<sup>91</sup>

The federal courts have repeatedly and consistently held that the executive branch may not through administrative action circumvent the INA's qualitative or numerical limits on employment visas, following Supreme Court pronouncements in *Karnuth*<sup>92</sup> and *Sure-Tan, Inc.*<sup>93</sup> that the policy and purpose of immigration law is preservation of jobs for American workers against the influx of foreign labor.

In 2002, in *Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB*, the Supreme Court itself invalidated a federal agency's award of back pay to an illegal alien.<sup>94</sup> The Court held that the 1986 IRCA amendments to the INA were a "comprehensive scheme that made combating the employment of illegal aliens in the United States central to the policy of immigration law," that awarding back pay to an illegal alien was "contravening

<sup>88.</sup> Nicaraguan and Central American Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 105-100, Title II, § 202, 11 Stat. 2195 (1997) (Cuban and Nicaraguan nationals); Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, div. A, Title IX, § 902(c)(3), 112 Stat. 2681-539 (1998) (Haitians); Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-62, Title VIII, § 814(c), 119 Stat. 3059 (2006) (battered spouses).

<sup>89.</sup> Nicaraguan and Central American Relief Act § 202; Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 1998 § 902(c)(3); Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005 § 814(c).

<sup>90.</sup> INA § 274(h)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1324(h)(3) (2012).

<sup>91.</sup> Mendoza v. Perez, 754 F.3d 1002, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 2014).

<sup>92.</sup> Karnuth v. United States, 279 U.S. 231, 243 (1929).

<sup>93.</sup> Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 893 (1984).

<sup>94. 535</sup> U.S. 137, 151 (2002).

explicit congressional policies" to deny employment to illegal immigrants, and that such an award would "unduly trench upon explicit statutory prohibitions critical to federal immigration policy" and "would encourage the successful evasion of apprehension by immigration authorities, condone prior violations of the immigration laws, and encourage future violations."<sup>95</sup>

Other federal circuit and district courts have invalidated executive branch agency decisions that enabled employers to avoid their collective bargaining contracts by hiring unauthorized alien workers. In May of 1985, the D.C. Circuit found in International Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen v. Meese that labor unions had standing to challenge the issuance of temporary worker visas to aliens who plainly did not qualify for those visa categories.<sup>96</sup> The court reasoned that, in construing the immigration laws, the courts "must look to the congressional objective behind the Act," which was "concern for and a desire to protect the interests of the American workforce."97 In 1985, citing the Supreme Court's decision in Karnuth and the D.C. Circuit's decision in International Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen v. Meese, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California declared that an Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) Operations Instruction that expanded the category of aliens eligible for temporary work visas beyond those specified in the statute was "unlawful" and that its enforcement was "permanently enjoined."98

Four years later, in *International Longshoremen's* & *Warehousemen's Union v. Meese*, the Ninth Circuit found that the INS's overbroad definition of "alien crewman" (who did not require labor certification in order to work near the docks) failed to promote "Congress' purpose of protecting American laborers from an influx of skilled and unskilled labor."<sup>99</sup>

Just last year in *Mendoza v. Perez*, the D.C. Circuit ruled that the Department of Labor had used improper procedures to create special rules for issuing temporary visas in the goat and sheepherding industry.<sup>100</sup> The court held that the "clear intent" of the temporary worker provisions enacted by Congress was "to protect American workers from the deleterious effects the employment of foreign labor might have on

<sup>95.</sup> *Id.* at 140–41, 148.

<sup>96. 761</sup> F.2d 798, 803 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

<sup>97.</sup> Id. at 804.

<sup>98.</sup> Int'l Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen v. Meese, 616 F.Supp. 1387, 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1985).

<sup>99. 891</sup> F.2d 1374, 1384 (9th Cir. 1989).

<sup>100. 754</sup> F.3d 1002, 1021–22 (D.C. Cir. 2014).

domestic wages and working conditions" and that an executive branch procedure that exposed American workers to substandard wages and working conditions "cannot be the result Congress intended."<sup>101</sup>

Another recent case that may provide a precedent for standing in any challenge to the issuance of EADs to illegal aliens under the President's deferred-action program is *Washington Alliance of Technology Workers v. United States Department of Homeland Security*, a case in which American technology workers challenged the legality of the Department of Homeland Security's eighteen-month extension of a program that permits foreign students to work in the United States after completing their studies.<sup>102</sup> In a decision dated November 21, 2014, the D.C. Circuit denied the government's motion to dismiss that claim, holding that the plaintiffs enjoyed "competitor standing," a doctrine which recognizes that a party suffers a cognizable injury when "agencies lift regulatory restrictions on their competitors or otherwise allow increased competition."<sup>103</sup>

The competitive advantage enjoyed by the alien students in that case was an exemption from employment taxes, which made them less expensive to hire. The illegal alien beneficiaries of the President's deferred-action program may also enjoy a competitive advantage by virtue of their exemption from the employer mandates of the Affordable Care Act.<sup>104</sup>

#### CONCLUSION

Based on the statutes, legislative history, case law, and analysis presented above, I conclude that each of the three assertions of legal authority needed to implement President Obama's "deferred action" program for five million illegal aliens violates our statutory immigration laws. The deferral of removal is based on dubious claims, exceeds the bounds of prosecutorial discretion, and violates section 235(a)(1) and (b)(2) of the INA; grants of advance parole also directly violate section 212(d)(5) of the INA as amended in 1996; and granting employment authorization to millions of illegal aliens directly contradicts numerous court decisions holding that the executive branch may not, under color of its power to administer the immigration laws, circumvent the statutory limits on the number of aliens allowed to compete in the U.S. labor

<sup>101.</sup> Id. at 1017.

<sup>102. 74</sup> F. Supp. 3d 247, 248–49 (D.C. Cir. 2014).

<sup>103.</sup> Id. at 251 (quoting Mendoza, 754 F.3d at 1011).

<sup>104.</sup> *See generally* The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).

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market. Taken together, these three illegal steps amount to a usurpation of the exclusive constitutional authority of Congress to formulate immigration policy.