Governor Cuomo Signs Executive Order Boycotting a Boycott

—by Ryan Lefkowitz

N.Y. Exec. Order No. 157 (June 5, 2016),

Abstract: New York State Governor Cuomo signed an executive order aimed to disallow transactions between New York State agencies and institutions engaged in the political protest of Israel through the use of boycotts, divestments, and sanctions.


On June 5th, 2016, New York State Governor Andrew Cuomo signed into action Executive Order 157 which prohibits state agencies from conducting business with companies that endorse and support economic sanctions for Israel. The executive order comes on the heels of the New York State legislature failing to push through two similar bills, Senate Bill S6378A and S6086. Executive Order 157 explicitly declares a “special historical relationship” and “commonly forged cultural bond” between New York State and Israel as well as the intention of New York State to “stand[] firmly with Israel.”

There are two main components to the executive order. The first involves the creation of a public blacklist of companies that are deemed to support “boycott, divestment, and sanctions activity targeting Israel” (also known as BDS). The executive order defines “boycott, divestment, or sanctions activity against Israel” as engaging in or promoting any activity that is intended to adversely affect Israel’s economy (including limiting commercial relations with both Israel and people in Israel) as a means of affecting political change. Because the executive order’s definition of BDS activities includes a requisite intent of affecting political change, the order relies on the Commissioner being able to reliably distinguish between companies using their buying power to boycott versus purchasing for personal preference.

The list of institutions and companies is to be compiled by the Commissioner of the Office of General Services within 180 days after its enactment. Included in the list will be institutions and companies that the Commissioner finds, through “credible information available to the public,” involved in BDS activities (either directly or through a parent or subsidiary). The order fails to define what means of obtaining information would fall under the umbrella term of “available to the public.” The list is to be publicly posted on the website of the Office of General Services and will be updated every 180 days.

Companies will be provided with written notice prior to being placed on the list, at which point they have ninety days to produce evidence showing they do not actually participate in boycott, divestment, or sanctions activity targeting Israel. If the Commissioner then makes a “good faith” determination that the institution does not engage in such activity, they will not be included on the list.

Any institution that is placed on the publicly published list can petition for removal by providing “written evidence” that the company has ceased its participation in BDS activities. There is no provision for if a company has erroneously been placed on the list and alleges that it has never engaged in BDS activity at all. Although the only requirement for being initially included on the list is “credible information” as evaluated by the Commissioner, the institution bears the burden of providing “written evidence” that they have stopped engaging in BDS activities in order to be removed from the list once published. Therefore, companies can petition to prevent their inclusion on the list by providing evidence they do not engage in BDS activities, but once they are included on the list the only way off is to show they have stopped such activity, not that they never engaged in it to begin with.

The second component of the executive order involves banning business dealings between “affected state agencies” and businesses that are deemed to be involved in or promote BDS activity. The order defines “affected state agencies” as any and all agencies and departments that the Governor has executive authority over, as well as all entities to which the Governor appoints the Chair, the Chief Executive, or the majority of Board Members (with the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey being an exception).

These entities are prohibited from financial dealings with any of the institutions on the publicly available blacklist. Entities that are currently involved with institutions that are deemed to engage in BDS activities have one year from the effective date of the order to comply. The executive order itself is effective immediately and is indefinite in length.

Executive Order 157 is the first of its kind in the country and Governor Cuomo has faced both praise and backlash for it. In light of the inability of the New York State legislature to pass similar bills, some have seen it as an unwarranted executive overreach on a divisive issue. Opponents of the bill’s contents argue that it is a politically motivated attack on the freedom of speech, exercised here through engagement in BDS activities, and is unconstitutional.

International Child Custody Case at the Second Circuit

by Dalya Bordman


Ermini v. Vittori, 758 F. 3d 153 (2d Cir. 2014).

An Italian family, parents Emiliano Ermini, Viviana Vittori, and children Emanuele and Daniele, moved to the United States from Italy in August of 2011 in efforts to find treatment for Daniele who is autistic. The family moved to Suffern, New York and enrolled the children in public school and put their home in Italy up for sale. Daniele started Applied Behavioral Analysis (ABA) therapy shortly after the family moved to New York. After a violent altercation in the U.S. between Ermini and Vittori, divorce proceedings were instituted in Italy and a temporary order of protection issued in New York gave Vittori temporary custody of the children.

In September 2012, Ermini petitioned an Italian court for an order directing Vittori to return to Italy with their children and although granted, several provisions of the order were vacated by the Court of Appeals in Rome. The Rome Order granted Vittori exclusive custody of the children and did not require her to return to Italy with the children. Ermini subsequently filed a petition in the Southern District of New York pursuant to the Hague Convention seeking the return of both Emanuele and Daniele back to Italy. In determining whether the Hague Convention applied, the district court concluded that the boys’ habitual residence was Italy and that Vittori had wrongfully retained the children in the United States without the consent of Ermini. Accordingly, the court found that the Hague Convention did apply, however, ruled in favor of Vittori’s affirmative defense that returning the children to their habitual country posed a grave risk to Daniele. Thus, the court denied Ermini’s petition to return the children to Italy without prejudice.

The Second Circuit, however, called into question the district court’s determinations that (1) the family did not change its habitual residence from Italy to the United States, and (2) that Vittori breached Ermini’s custody rights. Firstly, the Second Circuit reasoned that the family may have changed their habitual residence to the United States as they had leased a house in the United States, put their home in Italy on the market, enrolled their children in public school and extracurricular activities in the United States, planned to open a business in the United States, and shifted all of Daniele’s medical care and treatment to the United States. Additionally, both Ermini and Vittori agreed that the move could be indefinite if Daniele’s treatment was succeeding. Secondly, based on the Rome Order, in which custody of the children was granted to Vittori, the court questioned whether or not Vittori’s keeping the children in the United States against Ermini’s wishes actually breached Ermini’s custody rights, as Ermini did not have legal custody of the children. The Second Circuit, however, did not overturn the district court’s ruling on those grounds because the issues of habitual residency and breach of parental rights were complicated, and instead affirmed the district court’s decision based on the affirmative defense of grave risk of harm to the child if returned. Thus, the Second Circuit assumed, arguendo, that the family had not changed their habitual residence from Italy to the United States and that Vittori did breach Ermini’s parental rights by keeping the children in the United States. The Second Circuit then affirmed the district court’s decision denying Ermini’s petition because the grave risk of harm defense was satisfied as, (1) Daniele would face a grave risk of harm if he was taken out of his therapy in the United States, and (2) the children faced a grave risk of harm in Ermini’s custody because he was physically abusive.  The Second Circuit then amended the district court’s judgment to deny Ermini’s petition with prejudice, reasoning that the Hague Convention is used to decide instances of wrongful child removal and when the Convention is invoked, a child is returned or he is not, once that decision is made, the Convention is no longer needed in that situation. Thus, the court affirmed the district court’s decision and amended its judgment to deny Ermini’s petition with prejudice.

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(D)

Effective December 1, 2014

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(d) describes the procedure for an initial appearance in a felony case. The rule has been amended to add an additional section to 5(d)(1), the section which describes what the judge must inform the defendant of. Prior to the amendment there were five subsections of Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(d)(1)(A-E), therefore the additional subsection (F) will make six. The amendment does not change any of the existing text of the rule, simply adds the language:

[T]hat a defendant who is not a United States citizen may request that an attorney for the government or a federal law enforcement official notify a consular officer from the defendant’s country of nationality that the defendant has been arrested–but that even without the defendant’s request, a treaty or other international agreement may require consular notification.

The need for the additional section that addresses defendants whom are not a citizen of the United States derives from Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Regulations as well as bilateral agreements with numerous countries. Although Article 36 states that arresting officers are primarily responsible, by incorporative the advice regarding notice into the initial appearance procedure, the goal is not to relieve those officers of the duty. Instead, it provides additional assurance that the United States’ treaty obligations are fulfilled, and makes a judicial record of them. The Committee concluded that the most effective and efficient way to provide this information is to ensure every defendant receives it. Although it is likely that only defendants whom are held in custody would make such a request, the language makes clear that every defendant should be afforded such advice.

Questions still remain as to whether Article 36 creates individual rights and or remedies that may be invoked in a judicial proceeding. This amendment does not address those questions, nor does it create said rights or remedies.

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Note: The Prosecution of Child Soldiers: Balancing Accountability with Justice

I saw some other SBU [Small Boys Unit] boys coming closer to me with another small boy and the boy was crying, screaming.  He asked them, “What have I done?”  They didn’t say anything to him, but the boy was screaming.  At first they had to put his right arm on a log.  They took a machete and amputated it at the wrist.  The boy was screaming and they took the left arm again and put it on the same log and sliced it off.  He was still screaming and shouting.  They took the left leg and put it on the same log and cut it off at the ankle.  At last they took the right leg again and put it on the same log and cut it off with a machete.  Some held him by his hand at that time now and I am speaking about the same SBU boys.  They are the same people doing this.  Some held his other hand, legs.  They were swinging the boy.  They threw him over into a toilet pit.  I was there, I saw it myself.[1]

Children are capable of committing atrocious crimes.  With an estimated 300,000 child soldiers currently participating in armed conflict around the world,[2] children are undoubtedly responsible for numerous deaths, rapes, mutilations, and other crimes.  However, the international community has failed to set an age at which these children can be held legally responsible for their actions.  In contrast, domestic courts have further complicated the issue by setting the minimum age of criminal responsibility anywhere from seven to eighteen-years-old.

The Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”) provides the most widely accepted definition of childhood:[3]  a child “means every human being below the age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.”[4]  Unfortunately, the CRC lacks support from any international treaties binding this definition as the proper age of criminal responsibility.  Nonetheless, it correctly appears to allow for a lower age of majority taking into account individual cultures and domestic laws.

In determining the proper age at which a child can be held criminally liable, many factors must be considered, including physical and mental maturity, traditions, and culture.  Victims of these atrocities must also receive proper consideration.  Their quest for justice cannot be secondary to the rehabilitation and forgiveness of a child soldier.  This delicate balance is difficult to accommodate and certain non-judicial mechanisms, such as truth and reconciliation commissions and cultural cleansing rites, have provided some relief for both the victims and perpetrators.

While rehabilitative measures are preferable to judicial measures for all individuals under eighteen, both international and domestic courts must continue to retain their discretion to prosecute juveniles for the most atrocious crimes.  To properly ensure these judicial systems promote equality and justice, not simply retribution, it is crucial that the international community determine a uniform age at which a child can be held responsible in a global forum and consequently begin to set a precedent for domestic courts.

Part I of this Note introduces the basic concepts of international law, including international criminal law and the legal protections that have been established for individuals under eighteen-years-old.  Part II examines the difficulties that arise when determining the roles of children in armed conflict and the extent to which they can be held responsible for their actions.  Additionally, this section suggests several possible defenses that should be made available to juveniles if they are prosecuted in an international tribunal.  Part III provides a case study of the only person under eighteen years of age who has been prosecuted for a war crime since World War II and further evaluates the United States’ role in this trial and their general perspective towards the treatment of minors in combat.  Finally, Part IV emphasizes the need for an international consensus regarding the minimum age of criminal responsibility in international courts.

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Erin Lafayette: Syracuse University College of Law, J.D. 2013.

[1].  Transcript of Record ¶¶ 699-700, Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL 2003-01 (Jan. 8, 2008).  The SBU was a group of approximately 10,000 children, generally between the ages of 8-10, who were recruited by the Revolutionary United Front as militants during the civil war in Sierra Leone.  This was a common form of mutilation by children.

[2].  Children of Conflict:  Child Soldiers, BBC, (last visited Jan. 12, 2012).  This number is unclear due to the difficulty in accurately counting children recruited into armed conflict.

[3].  Matthew Happold, Child Soldiers:  Victims or Perpetrators?, 29 U. La Verne L. Rev. 56, 62 (2008).  The CRC has been ratified by every State except the United States, Somalia, and South Sudan.

[4].  Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 1, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRC].

Article: The Influence of International Human Trafficking on United States Prostitution Laws: The Case of Expungement Laws

When the issue of human trafficking first gained widespread public attention in the United States in the 1990s, the discussion centered on international human trafficking.  In 2000, the United States passed an anti-trafficking law, popularly called the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA), and the United Nations adopted an anti-trafficking treaty called the Palermo Protocol.  Both the TVPA and the Palermo Protocol focused on combating international human trafficking by encouraging countries around the world to pass laws against trafficking and prosecute traffickers.  Meanwhile, in the United States, state-level criminal justice systems treated United States citizens qualifying under the federal definition of “human trafficking victim” as criminals by prosecuting them for prostitution.  Activists for sexually exploited women and girls in the United States noted the irony that the United States was so concerned about trafficking in other countries, but was neglecting trafficking of its own citizens.  The United States was allowing laws and practices in the states that it was condemning in other nations.  For example, federal law requires other countries to ensure that victims of trafficking are not inappropriately incarcerated for unlawful acts as a direct result of being trafficked.[1]  Yet many states lack laws ensuring that sex trafficking victims are not prosecuted for prostitution.  As a result, anti-trafficking activists have put pressure on Congress and state legislatures to apply the same legal standards used in an international context to sexually exploited women and girls in the United States.  They are leveraging the international human trafficking legal framework to push for legal change to state laws on prostitution.

This essay will begin with an explanation of the legal framework for addressing international human trafficking, including the definitions of trafficking and the laws and policies developed to eradicate human trafficking.  Then the essay will describe how this framework has come to influence state laws in the United States, focusing in particular on the recent trend of laws allowing for the expungement of prostitution convictions if the defendant can show that she was a victim of sex trafficking.  The essay will conclude by evaluating the effectiveness of this legal framework at both the international and domestic level.

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Carrie N. Baker is an Assistant Professor in the Program for the Study of Women and Gender at Smith College in Northampton, Massachusetts.  Baker holds a B.A. in Philosophy from Yale University and an M.A., J.D., and Ph.D. in Women’s Studies from Emory University.  Her work has been published in numerous law and women’s studies journals.  Her book, The Women’s Movement Against Sexual Harassment (Cambridge University Press, 2008), won the National Women’s Studies Association 2008 Sara A. Whaley book prize.

[1]. 22 U.S.C. § 7106(b)(2) (2006 & Supp. III 2010).

Article: The Limits of International Law: Efforts to Enforce Rulings of the International Court of Justice in U.S. Death Penality Cases

Since the Supreme Court reinstated the death penalty in 1976,[1] the United States has executed twenty-eight foreign nationals from fifteen different countries.[2]  Most of those foreign nationals were never informed of their rights to consular notification and access under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,[3] a treaty the United States ratified in 1969.[4]  Violations of Article 36 in capital cases have caused consternation in foreign capitals and endless litigation in domestic courts and international tribunals.  Mexico, which has the largest number of foreign nationals on death row,[5] established the Mexican Capital Legal Assistance Program in 2000 to assist its nationals facing the death penalty and to ensure that Vienna Convention claims were aggressively litigated.[6]  Several foreign governments have filed briefs in state and federal courts describing the nature of the assistance they could have provided if their nationals had been promptly notified of their consular rights.[7]  In dozens of cases, appellate lawyers have argued that consular assistance could have made the difference between life and death.  Yet, even in the wake of favorable judgments from the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights,[8] the Inter-American Court on Human Rights,[9] and the International Court of Justice (ICJ),[10] national courts have persistently refused to grant any measure of relief to condemned foreign nationals, even in cases in which the violation was undisputed.  As of September 2011, domestic courts have overturned death sentences on the basis of Article 36 violations in only two cases.[11]

In light of these statistics, it is tempting to conclude that Article 36 litigation has had negligible effects on the application of the death penalty in the United States.  And indeed, under no circumstances could even the most optimistic internationalist claim that Article 36 litigation has been a resounding success.  But it would be similarly misguided to say that Article 36 litigation has had no effect on domestic legal culture.  As an initial matter, the United States complied with the ICJ’s provisional measures order in Avena and Other Mexican Nationals,[12] leading to a five-year moratorium on the execution of Mexican nationals in the United States.[13]  In addition, the death sentences of two Mexican nationals were vacated in direct response to the ICJ’s final judgment in Avena; one of those cases is examined in greater detail below.  And finally, litigation over violations of the Vienna Convention in U.S. death penalty cases has attracted substantial public commentary calling on the courts and Congress to comply with their international obligations.  Although it is too soon to say whether the United States will ultimately comply with the ICJ’s Avena judgment in the cases of Mexican nationals who remain on death row, there can be little question that litigation in domestic and international tribunals has led to increased awareness of the United States’ obligations under the Vienna Convention, which in turn has led to greater compliance with Article 36 at the trial level.

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Sandra Babcock: Clinical Professor and Clinical Director, Center for International Human Rights, Northwestern University School of Law.  I was counsel for the government of Mexico in Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, and subsequently represented Mexican nationals Osbaldo Torres, José Medellín, Roberto Moreno Ramos, and Humberto Leal García.  I witnessed many of the events described in this essay, and could not fairly be described as an objective observer.  Nonetheless, my involvement in the litigation described herein allows for a more nuanced perspective on both the successes and failures associated with our attempts to obtain legal remedies for foreign nationals whose consular rights were violated.

[1]. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187, 207 (1976).

[2]. Confirmed Foreign Nationals Executed Since 1976, Death Penalty Info. Center, (last updated Oct. 2, 2011).

[3]. Id.; see generally Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, United Nations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77.

[4]. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 3, at 77 (entered into force Dec. 24, 1969).

[5]. Reported Foreign Nationals Under Sentence of Death in the U.S., Death Penalty Info. Center, (last updated Oct. 2, 2011).

[6]. Michael Fleishman, Reciprocity Unmasked: The Role of the Mexican Government in Defense of its Foreign Nationals in United States Death Penalty Cases, 20 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 359, 393-94 (2003) (describing Mexico’s consular assistance in capital cases in Texas and elsewhere over the last several decades).

[7]. See, e.g., Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. 1269, 1273 (E.D. Va. 1996); Complaint at ¶¶ 70, 76, United Mexican States v. Woods (D. Ariz. 1997) (No. CIV 97-1075-PHX SMM); see generally Brief of the Gov’t of the United Kingdom of Great Britain & N. Ireland as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner-Appellant & Reversal, Carty v. Quarterman, 345 Fed. Appx. 897 (5th Cir. 2009) (No. 08-70049).

[8]. See, e.g., Martínez Villareal v. United States, Case 11,753, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 52/02, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117, doc. 1 rev. ¶ 64 (2003), available at

[9]. See The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 16, ¶¶ 121-22 (Oct. 1, 1999), available at

[10]. See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 12, 71-72 (Mar. 31).

[11]. See Torres v. Oklahoma, 120 P.3d 1184, 1189-90 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005); Valdez v. Oklahoma, 46 P.3d 703, 709-11 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002).  In Valdez, the court’s decision to vacate the death sentence of Gerardo Valdez was based on its finding that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to contact the Mexican consulate and make use of the resources consular officers would have provided.  Valdez, 46 P.3d at 710.  Although the court found the petitioner’s Vienna Convention claim to be procedurally barred, the court’s decision to grant relief was based on its conclusion that the Mexican consulate would have provided extensive assistance if it had been notified of Valdez’s detention.  Id. at 709-10.  For that reason, I include it among the cases in which Vienna Convention claims have prevailed—although I recognize that others may quibble with this assessment.

[12]. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Provisional Measures, 2003 I.C.J. 6 (Feb. 5).

[13]. See Confirmed Foreign Nationals Executed Since 1976, supra note 2.  After Mexico filed its application instituting proceedings in the ICJ in January 2003, no Mexican national whose case was addressed in the ICJ proceedings was executed until August 5, 2008, when Texas executed José Medellín Rojas.  Id.

Article: Marauders in the Courts: Why the Federal Courts Have Got the Problem of Maritime Priacy (Partly) Wrong

In December 2004, Los Angeles couple Jean and Scott Adam embarked on a round-the-world voyage on their yacht, the s/v Quest.1  They hoped to spend their retirement on the seas, engaging in, as they put it, “friendship evangelism—that is, finding homes for thousands of Bibles, which have been donated through grants and gifts, as we travel from place to place.”2  In February 2011, their vessel was boarded by Somali pirates almost 200 nautical miles off the coast of Oman.3  The U.S. Navy responded immediately, sending an aircraft carrier, a guided-missile cruiser, and two guided-missile destroyers to the Quest’s rescue.4  The Navy made contact with the pirates by bridge-to-bridge radio, and two pirates boarded the U.S.S. Sterett to engage in direct negotiations for the hostages’ release.5  But at 8 AM on February 23rd, a rocket-propelled grenade was fired from the Quest at the Sterett and gunfire erupted aboard the yacht.6  A Special Forces Team arrived moments later to find all four members of the Quest’s crew shot by their captors.7  All four perished.8  Fourteen of the Quest’s assailants—thirteen Somalis and one Yemeni—were transferred to federal custody and brought to Norfolk, Virginia, where federal criminal proceedings were initiated against them.9

The pirating of the Quest was but one of a record 163 attacks by Somali pirates in the first six months of 2011;10 yet it captured the nation’s attention unlike any of the others.10  The human drama that unfolded during the four-day standoff was the stuff of Hollywood movies.  But a courtroom drama is about to unfold in the wake of the Quest that might well prove a tragicomedy.  Notwithstanding the ubiquity of maritime piracy as a fixture of popular culture and the antiquity of piracy as an international and municipal legal offense, a debate is presently underway over what, exactly, piracy means.

The District Court of the Eastern District of Virginia offered two conflicting definitions of piracy in as many months. In United States v. Said, Judge Raymond A. Jackson held that robbery is an essential element of piracy.11.))  Judge Mark Davis adopted a far more expansive definition of piracy in United States v. Hasan.12  Under the Said decision, the attack on the Quest would not likely qualify as a pirating, a proposition that calls to mind a 1934 ruling of the House of Lords:

When it is sought to be contended . . . that armed men sailing the seas on board a vessel, without any commission from any State, could attack and kill everybody on board another vessel, sailing under a national flag, without committing the crime of piracy unless they stole, say, an article worth sixpence, their Lordships are almost tempted to say that a little common sense is a valuable quality in the interpretation of international law.13

This article yields to the temptation of common sense in demonstrating, with scholarly rigor, that the Said court got its definition of piracy terribly wrong.  Part I offers an account of the dual nature of maritime piracy as both an offense under customary international law and an offense under the municipal law of the United States. It shows how these two legal approaches to maritime piracy have been integrated over time through successive acts of Congress, and also explains the jurisdictional implications of early American piracy cases.  Part II examines the Said and Hasan cases as part of that juridical tradition.  It argues that the Said ruling was predicated on a myopic view of the treatment of maritime piracy by U.S. law and policy, and must therefore be rejected. The article concludes with an assessment of the implications of the Somali piracy cases from the standpoint of judicial policy, both domestic and international.

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Tara Helfman: Assistant Professor, Syracuse University College of Law; Yale Law School, J.D.; University of Cambridge, M.Phil., Political Thought & Intellectual History; University College London, M.A., Legal & Political Theory.  The author wishes to thank Dean Hannah Arterian of the Syracuse University College of Law for the generous research grant that made this article possible.  She also wishes to thank Rakesh Anand, David Crane, Evan Criddle, Isaac Kfir, Kevin Maillard, Edgar J. McManus, Matteo Taussig Rubbo, and Terry L. Turnipseed for their invaluable comments as the article took shape.  Any faults are attributable solely to the author.

  1. Jean Adam, Welcome to s/v Quest Adventure Log, S/V QUEST, (last updated Dec. 21, 2010). []
  2. Id. []
  3. Department of Defense News Briefing with Vice Admiral Fox via Telephone from Bahrain on Somali Piracy Aboard the S/V Quest, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (Feb. 22, 2011), available at []
  4. Id. []
  5. Id. []
  6. Id. []
  7. Id. []
  8. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEF., supra note 3. []
  9. Indictment, United States v. Salad, Case 2:11-cr-00034-MSD-DEM (E.D. Va. Mar. 8, 2011), available at Two of the defendants pled guilty to charges of piracy under the law of nations and hostage-taking resulting in death. One pled guilty to having fired the rocket-propelled grenade launcher at the U.S.S. Sterett. Three Somalis Plead Guilty to Charges Relating to Piracy of Quest, NEWSROOM MAG. (May 20, 2011, 6:00 AM), []
  10. See, e.g., Americans slain by captors on hijacked yacht; pirates killed, arrested, CNNWORLD (Feb. 22, 2011),; Four Americans Killed on Yacht Hijacked by Somali Pirates, FOXNEWS.COM (Feb. 22, 2011),; Four American hostages killed by Somali pirates, MSNBC.COM (Feb. 22, 2011, 3:15:02 PM), []
  11. 757 F. Supp. 2d 554, 560 (E.D. Va. 2010) (citing United States v. Madera-Lopez, 190 Fed. Appx. 832, 836 (11th Cir. 2006 []
  12. See generally 747 F. Supp. 2d 642 (E.D. Va. 2010). []
  13. In re Piracy Jure Gentium, [1934] A.C. 586 (P.C.) 594 (U.K.). []